It is argued that donald davidson has not succeeded in showing that we need a constructive theory of meaning--A theory for a natural language which davidson considers to have as its base a finite number of semantic primitives--In order to explain language learning and, In particular, Linguistic productivity. This linguistic productivity is the ability of a speaker who has mastered the meaning of a finite stock of words and a finite number of grammatical rules, To produce and understand sentences which (...) he has not constructed or encountered before. (shrink)

It is commonly supposed that the philosophy of education is not a reputable area of concern for a philosopher. I have never heard a coherent, sustained and successful case made for this view. Only vague remarks about ‘autonomy’ and narrowly protectionist views of philosophy are ventured. So I shall not discuss the matter further. I shall simply be content to side with Plato, Aristotle, Comenius, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Mill and Dewey, who thought that educational issues fell within the province of (...) philosophy. Kant was so concerned with education that he interrupted his work on the Critique of Pure Reason in order to support Basedow's experimental school, the Philanthropin, and the educational reforms which it intended to institute. Kant says ‘… the greatest and most difficult problem to which man can devote himself is the problem of education.’ But if those who hold that the philosophy of education is unimportant, or even disreputable, have come to that view after examining a good deal of what is currently being said in this field, then their adverse reaction is not hard to understand, because a good deal of contemporary work here is clearly inadequate. I hope to show that the contemporary perspective is too narrow, and to advocate a return to a more traditional view of the philosophy of education in the hope that the subject may once again be given the importance which was formerly attributed to it. (shrink)

We shall be concerned to show that the argument is unsound; that is, even if the premises were true, and we shall argue that they are not, the conclusions of the various forms of the argument do not follow from them. In particular, we wish to deny that the activity of translation commits us to accepting abstract entities such as propositions. Hence we do not regard the argument as providing support for any of,, and. However, although we accept the contradictories (...) of and, and although we reject we do not wish to analyze belief in terms of sentence acceptance. For while the set of sentences to which a person is prepared to assent is evidence of what he believes, it follows from Quine’s indeterminacy thesis that a person’s pattern of belief is underdetermined by this evidence. In fact, the translation argument that we are about to discuss may itself be rejected on the basis of Quine’s indeterminacy thesis, but we are concerned here to challenge the argument by its own standards. (shrink)